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Using primary data from two districts of Pakistan, this article analyses the supply-
side determinants of child labour. The study finds that the birth-order of the child has a 
significant association with schooling and labour decision of child: first school enrolment 
of children is delayed; there exists gender disparity in favour of male children; the 
children from female-headed households are more likely to go to school; the education of 
the head of household has a positive impact on child’s schooling; among the parent’s 
parameters mother’s education is more important than father’s; parental education is 
positively associated with child schooling and negatively associated with child labour. 
The ownership of assets impacts the schooling positively, and labour negatively; the 
household size affects the schooling negatively, and work positively; and household 
composition also has a significant effect on schooling and child labour. The children from 
urban areas are more likely to go to school. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
According to Child Labour Survey 1996, among the 40 million children aged 
5–14 years, 3.3 million, i.e., 8.3 percent are economically active in Pakistan. Out of 
these, 2.4 million (73 percent of the child labour force) child labourers are boys and 
0.9 million (27 percent of the child labour force) are girls. 
There is expanding literature on child labour that provides empirical evidence 
on the nature and determinants of child labour. The previous literature on Pakistani 
child labour includes Khan (1982); Hussain (1985); Ahmed (1991); Khan and Ali 
(1991) and Weiner and Noman (1995); and recently Addison, et al. (1997); Burki 
and Fasih (1998); Burki and Shahnaz (2001); Ray (2000); Ray (2000a); Ray (2001) 
and Ali and Khan (2003). Some studies [see for instance Khan (1982); Ahmed 
(1991); Chaudhary and Khan (2002)] discuss mainly the qualitative features of child 
labour. These studies consist largely of case studies interviewing working children. 
Some literature focuses on the quantitative aspect of child labour. Within the 
empirical literature on child labour, there has been a shift in emphasis from 
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quantification to econometric analysis. An advantage of the econometric analysis, 
using household surveys, is that these studies offer information on children who do 
work and do not work, thereby making it possible to investigate the child labour 
decision by households. The present study is still another effort to analyse child 
labour econometrically. Many of the previous studies have shown mixed results. 
This is not so surprising due to the fact that most of these studies have stressed either 
the male or the female gender; either rural or urban regions; either landowner or 
landless classes. Or, they have stressed some specific types of child labour, not 
capturing the full picture. For example, if there are negative effects of an explanatory 
variable in some sub-groups but not others, aggregation may obscure them. The 
different definitions of child labour used in some studies also obscure the results.  
Ray (2000) shows that child labour takes different forms in different regions; 
consequently, the policies to reduce it vary within regions. The formulation of policies 
that are effective in curbing child labour requires an analysis of its key determinants, 
namely, identification of variables that have a significant effect on child labour. The 
central motivation of the present study is to analyse the determinants of child labour in 
the age group of 5–15 years in Pakistan. The point of departure of the present study from 
its predecessors lies in the use of primary data collected by this researcher. The previous 
studies, for example Burki and Fasih (1998) used the data from Child Labour Survey 
1996 (for the age group of 5–14 years), which was collected by cluster survey, where 
concentration of child labour existed. Although I have also used the cluster sample 
technique, the sample was selected so that it consisted of all the households of all income 
groups regardless of concentration of child labour. Similarly, Ray (2000, 2000a) obtained 
the data for children in the age group of 10–14 years from Pakistan Integrated Household 
Survey 1991, and Burki and Shahnaz (2001) used the data for children in the age group 
of 10–14 years from the Labour Force Survey 1996-97.  
 
OBJECTIVES 
The precise objectives of the study are to analyse the supply-side determinants 
of child labour, i.e., to determine the relation between the decision of the parents (to 
send their children to school only, to school and work, to work only, or to no school 
and no work) and four categories of socio-economic variables: child parameters, 
head of the household parameters, parents parameters, and household parameters. 
(The parameters have been defined in Table 1.)  
 
METHODOLOGY 
Definitions and Instruments. The definition of child is very significant in 
analysing children’s activities. An increase in the age of the child enhances the 
opportunity cost of education in terms of income forgone, or missing the household 
chores, due to schooling, although the schooling is the foremost activity in connection 
with child welfare. Burki and Shahnaz (2001) and Ray (2000, 2000a) have analysed the 
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child schooling and child labour for the children within the age cohort of 10–14 years as 
data were available only for this particular age group. The originality of the present study 
lies in the appropriate definition of child. So a child is defined as a person who is 5–15 
years old. Age 15 coincides with the end of school age. Likewise, the cut-off age between 
infancy and childhood is age 5. Child labour is defined as “the participation of school-age 
children (5–15 years) in the labour force, i.e., work for wage or in household enterprises 
to earn a living for themselves or to support household income”.  
Income of the household is taken as non-child income of household. This 
reflects the assumption that decisions on child labour are taken after adult and other 
non-child earnings are determined. This underlies the ‘Luxury Axiom’ of Basu and 
Van (1998), namely, that a family will send the child to the labour market only if the 
family’s income from non-child labour sources drops very low. 
Sampling and Data Collection. Cluster sample technique is adopted. Sample 
of the population, i.e., the Pakpattan and Faisalabad districts are selected purposely. 
The clusters of the sample are also selected purposely to represent the average 
conditions of the sample. The households in the cluster comprised all income groups 
across all walks of life. 
Household survey is the main source of data. The mode of data collection 
used is interviews with the head of the household. The sample observations consist 
of two thousand households, one thousand from each district.  
Model. In order to disentangle the different determinants of child labour and 
to assess the relative importance of each of the factors influencing child labour 
decisions, the household decision-making is empirically estimated in the context of a 
formal analytical model assuming parents’ altruistic behaviour about their children.1 
The households are assumed to use a sequential decision process, keeping the 
schooling of their children as a priority for the welfare of their children. So, in the 
study, the decision of child labour is analysed as a sequential decision-making 
process, using sequential probit model. Burki and Shahnaz (2001) have used the 
simultaneous approach on Pakistani data arguing that since (i) in the country literacy 
rate is very low and (ii) unemployment of educated manpower is on the rise, it is too 
optimistic to assume that Pakistani households are capable of making the hierarchical 
choice. They also point out that there exists a trade-off between child welfare and the 
household’s need of income. However, the sequential approach is justified by two 
points: (i) the sequential model approach has an advantage over the simultaneous 
approach [Grootaert (1999a)]; (ii) a number of qualitative studies about child labour 
in Pakistan mention that the majority of the parents of child labourers and child 
labourers themselves have given first preference to schooling.     
In fact, there are advantages and disadvantages to each approach (multinomial 
logit and sequential probit). The appeal of the multinomial logit approach is that only 
 
1For parent’s altruism towards children, see Basu and Van (1998). 
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one equation is needed to be estimated, which by construction will yield a consistent 
set of probabilities showing the effect of a change in each explanatory variable on the 
probability of selecting each option. There are several drawbacks. However, the most 
important is that the multinomial logit model requires the assumption of the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives, that is, it assumes that the odds ratios derived 
from the model remain the same, irrespective of the number of choices offered [see 
Maddala (1983)]. In practice, this assumption is inappropriate when the choices 
include close substitutes. In the case of child labour, e.g., it requires that the decision-
maker view the choices between work and home-care as independent from other 
options and not affected by whether or not a schooling option is available. Obviously, 
that is a very unlikely situation. If non-independent choices are included in the 
multinomial logit model, the model will overestimate the probability for those options. 
On balance, sequential approach is selected, and the sequential choices 
making the welfare of the child are assumed as: (i) schooling, (ii) schooling and 
work, (iii) work only, and (iv) neither schooling nor work.2  This leads to the 
following four choices, and choice probabilities, to be estimated for each child: 
P1  =  Probability to go to school and not to work. 
P2  =  Probability to go to school and to work. 
P3  =  Probability not to go to school but to work. 
P4  =  Probability neither to go to school nor to work.  
In the sequential probit model, the probabilities for the four choices are 
determined as follows: 
 P1 = f (b1X) 
 P2 = [1 – f (b1 X)] f (b2 X) 
 P3 = [1 – f (b1 X)] [1– f (b2 X)] f (b3 X) 
 P4 = [1 – f (b1 X)] [1– f (b2 X)] [1– f (b3 X)] f (b4 X) 
Where f represents the standard normal distribution function, and b1, b2, b3 and b4 are 
vectors of the model parameters. The vector X contains the explanatory variables. 
Parameters b1 are estimated over the entire sample. Parameters b2 are estimated over 
the sample of children excluding those who go to school only. Parameters b3 are 
estimated over the sample of children excluding those who go to school only, and 
who go to school and work simultaneously. Parameter b4 are estimates for all the 
remaining. 
Four groups of explanatory variables have been selected as determinants of 
the child labour on the basis of previous economic literature on child labour [see: 
 
2Although it is considerable that in conservative households the priority choice, particularly for 
girls, may be ‘no school-no work’, yet assuming the altruistic model, the households prefer schooling for 
their children. Many researchers have adopted the same ordering [see, for instance, Burki and Fasih 
(1998)].  
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Burki and Fasih (1998); Cartwright (1999); Cartwright and Patrinos (1999); Ray 
(1999); Grootaert (1999); Ray (2000); Ray (2000a); Maitra and Ray (2000); Sawada 
and Lokshin (2000); Burki and Shahnaz (2001); Ray (2001); Ali and Khan (2003)]. 
The definition of the explanatory variables used in the sequential probit model 
are represented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Definition of Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
Variables Definition 
Dependent Variables  
  P1 [Child goes to school only]. 1 if child goes to school and not to work, 0 otherwise. 
  P2 [Child goes to school as well as to work]. 1 if child goes to school and to work, 0 otherwise. 
  P3 [Child does not go to school but to work]. 1 if child does not go to school but to work, 0 otherwise. 
  P4 [Child neither goes to school nor to work]. 1  if child neither go to school nor to work, 0 otherwise. 
Independent Variables Child Characteristics 
  Bord [Birth order of child].  Birth order of child among his/her brothers and sisters. 
  Cgen [Child’s gender]. 1 if child is male, 0 otherwise. 
  Cage [Child’s age].  Child’s age in completed years. 
  Cagesq [Child’s age squared].  Child’s age squared. 
  Cage615 [Child’s age for the children in the age 
group of 6-15 years]. 
 Child’s age in completed years for the children in the age 
group of 6-15 years. 
  Cagesq615 [Child’s age squared for the children 
in the age group of 6-15 years]. 
 Child’s age squared for the children in the age group of 6-
15 years. 
  Cedu [Child’s education].  Child’s education in completed years of education. 
 Head of Household’s Characteristics 
  Hgen [Head of household’s gender]. 1 if head of household is male, 0 otherwise. 
  Hage [Head of household’s age].  Head of household’s age in completed years. 
  Hagesq [Head of household’s age squared].  Head of household’s age squared. 
  Hedu [Head of household’s education].  Head of household’s completed years of education. 
  Hemp [Head of household’s employment].  1 if head of household is employed, 0 otherwise. 
  Hy [Head of household’s income].  Head of household’s income per month in rupees. 
 Parent Characteristics 
  Fedu [Father’s education].  Father’s education in completed years of education. 
  Femp [Father’ employment].  1 if father is employed, 0 otherwise. 
  Fy [Father’s income].  Father’s income per month in Rupees. 
  Medu [Mother’s education].  Mother’s completed years of education. 
  Memp [Mother’s employment].  1 if mother is employed, 0 otherwise. 
  My [Mother’s income].  Mother’s income per month in Rupees. 
 Household Characteristics 
  Asst [Household’s ownership of assets].  1 if the household has ownership of assets, 0 otherwise. 
  Pcexp [Per capita expenditure of household].  Household’s per capita expenditure in Rupees per month. 
  Fmsiz [Household family size].  Number of household members. 
  Child 04  Number of children ages 4 or less than 4 years in the 
household. 
  Child 015  Number of children ages 15 or less than 15 years in the 
household. 
  Boy 16  Number of male siblings of 16 years of age or above in the 
household. 
  Girl 16  Number of female siblings of 16 years of age or above in 
the household. 
  Loc  1 if household is urban, 0 otherwise. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The mean and standard deviations of the explanatory variables are shown in 
Table 2. The sequential probit results are presented in Table 3 for the children age 5–
15 years. The table reports the probability derivatives of the parameter estimates, 
computed at the means of the explanatory variables. These derivatives show the 
percentage point change in probability for a one unit increase at the mean of a given 
explanatory variable holding all other variables constant at the mean. In the 
parentheses the t-statistics are shown. The majority of the results are consistent with 
the theoretical implications of child labour. 
The first-stage results show the probability of going to school and not to work. 
The second estimation stage eliminates from the sample the children who go to 
school only. The probability to be determined for the remaining sample is that of 
combining school and work. The third stage of the estimation looks only at the 
children who are not in school and determines the probability that they will work for 
wages or in household enterprises rather than home-care task or do not go to school 
and do not work at all. 
Birth-order. In the economic literature there is no consensus about whether 
the birth-order effect on child schooling and labour really exists, and if it exists at all, 
whether it is positive, negative, or non-linear in form [Parish and Willis (1993)]. 
There are two possible cases [Behrman and Taubman (1986)]. In the first case, there 
may be a negative birth-order effect. As more children are born, the household 
resource constraint becomes severe and fewer resources are available per child. If per 
child resource shrinkage effect is dominant, the younger (high birth-order) children 
receive less education than other siblings. In the second case, the resource 
competition effects might decline over time, since household can accumulate assets 
and increase income over time and the older children may enter the labour market, 
contributing to household resources. This may be a positive birth-order effect and 
younger children may spend more years at school. Moreover, the economy of scale 
in household-level public goods may equally be important, since younger children 
can learn easily from the experience of their older siblings through home teaching. 
So, older siblings might promote the education of younger children, rather than 
impede the education of those children. If the resource extension and economies of 
scale effect and externalities are larger than the competition effect, the birth-order 
effect again will be positive. There is another explanation of positive birth-order 
effect, that is, children may be required to perform household chores and related 
tasks, and older children are more likely to have to forgo some years of education 
than younger children in the family [see, Sathar (1993)]. As Sathar and Kazi (1990) 
found, for example, in Karachi, employed women rely more on their eldest daughters 
to fulfil household obligations. Present research suggests that birth-order exists and, 
more importantly, it is negative for school-only decision. The birth-order of a child 
among his/her brothers  and  sisters  shows that the younger brothers and sisters have  
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics of Variables (Means and Standard Deviations) 
 
 
Variables 
Children 
Going to School 
Only 
Children 
Going to School as 
well as to Work 
Child 
not Going to School 
but to Work 
Child 
Neither Goes to School 
Nor to Work 
Child Characteristics 
Bord  
 
2.2222 
 [1.2163] 
1.6400 
[0.8980] 
2.1186 
[1.2468] 
2.6307 
[1.3757] 
Cgen 
  
0.5883 
[0.8273] 
0.7600 
[0.4314] 
0.5593 
[0.5007] 
0.4461 
[0.5009] 
Cage 
 
9.7481 
[3.1009] 
12.8600 
[2.2678] 
11.0847 
[2.7435] 
8.6615 
[3.4788] 
Cagesq 
 
104.61 
[62.0636] 
170.42 
[53.7492] 
130.2711 
[56.7896] 
86.9384 
[67.7511] 
Cage615 
 
10.2320 
[2.8354] 
13.6321 
[2.9231] 
12.9640 
[2.3642] 
9.8662 
[2.9421] 
Cage615sq 
 
100.29 
[58.7974] 
186.43 
[62.3489] 
168.7349 
[71.0984] 
101.3862 
[63.6734] 
Cedu 
 
3.1041 
[3.1098] 
4.3800 
[2.4980] 
0.9235 
[1.9681] 
0.7254 
[1.2371] 
Head of Household Characteristics 
Hgen 
 
0.9951 
[0.0695] 
0.9301 
[0.0345] 
0.9931 
[0.0078] 
0.9846 
[9.1420] 
Hage 
 
42.7312 
[8.5739] 
46.2000 
 [8.5475] 
45.4745 
[9.4126] 
41.9846 
[9.1420] 
Hagesq 
 
1899.29 
[748.77] 
2206.04 
[823.53] 
2155.03 
[951.48] 
1845.00 
[808.13] 
Hedu 
 
5.4285 
[6.0441] 
3.6600 
[3.9362] 
0.6440 
[1.4234] 
0.9076 
[2.4541] 
Hemp 
 
0.8765 
[0.3293] 
0.8300 
0.4329 
0.5932 
[0.4954] 
0.8307 
[0.3778] 
Hy 
 
4366.76 
[6941.03] 
2152.00 
[1280.18] 
1316.94 
[941.96] 
1821.53 
[1189.99] 
Parent Characteristics 
Fedu 
 
5.4188 
[6.5207] 
3.6600 
[3.9362] 
0.6440 
[1.4234] 
0.9076 
[2.4541] 
Femp 
 
0.8765 
[0.3293] 
0.9801 
0.0045 
0.5932 
[0.4954] 
0.8307 
[0.3778] 
Fy 
 
4613.19 
[7636.77] 
2152.00 
[1280.18] 
1232.20 
[575.48] 
1752.30 
[991.85] 
Medu 
 
4.6247 
[6.2108] 
1.4600 
[2.9291] 
0.1186 
[0.9113] 
0.1236 
[0.8321] 
Memp 
 
0.8813 
[0.3237] 
0.9400 
[0.2399] 
0.6610 
[0.4774] 
0.8307 
[0.3778] 
My 2180.87 
[2317.06] 
780.00 
[875.86] 
616.94 
[621.77] 
707.69 
[698.95] 
Household Characteristics 
Asst 
 
0.7748 
[0.4182] 
0.8669 
[0.3505] 
0.5254 
[0.5036] 
0.5692 
[0.4990] 
Pcexp 1260.08 
[2317.06] 
493.17 
[326.32] 
296.93 
[214.90] 
382.06 
[245.84] 
Fmsiz 
 
6.9588 
[1.8396] 
7.2600 
[1.4258] 
7.4915 
[1.7555] 
7.5230 
[2.0999] 
Child015 
 
3.9661 
[1.5930] 
3.8800 
[1.5069] 
4.5423 
[1.6228] 
4.6461 
[1.8576] 
Child04 
 
0.4987 
[0.7023] 
0.3200 
[0.5510] 
0.5423 
[0.6777] 
0.8307 
[0.8398] 
Boy16 
 
0.4285 
[0.7226] 
0.6600 
[0.8478] 
0.5832 
[0.7836] 
0.4912 
[0.8823] 
Girl16 
 
0.3414 
[0.6325] 
0.5600 
[0.7602] 
0.4942 
[0.7962] 
0.5554 
[0.6359] 
Loc 0.6369 
[0.5921] 
0.4962 
[0.5245] 
0.6779 
[0.4712] 
0.4153 
[0.4966] 
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Table 3 
Sequential Probit Results for (5–15 Years) Children 
 
 
 
Variables 
First Stage 
P1= 
Probability 
that the Child 
Goes to School 
Only 
Second Stage 
P2= 
Probability 
that the Child 
Goes to School 
as well as to 
Work 
Third Stage 
P3= 
Probability 
that the Child 
does not Go to 
School but to 
Work 
Fourth Stage 
P4= 
Probability 
that the Child 
Neither Goes to 
School Nor to 
Work 
Constant –1.3332 
[–2.0325] 
0.1644 
[0.5918] 
–0.9007 
[–1.5953] 
0.9981 
[1.7912] 
Child Characteristics 
Bord  
 
–0.0437 
[–1.3058]** 
0.0071 
[1.6838]* 
–0.0172 
[1.5307]* 
0.0109 
[1.3067]** 
Cgen 
  
0.0206 
[–1.8858]* 
0.0127 
[1.7248]* 
0.0385 
[1.7140]* 
–0.0968 
[–1.7486]* 
Cage 
 
0.1437 
[3.8714]* 
–0.0180 
[–2.3050]* 
0.0857 
[1.5235]** 
–0.1578 
[–2.8016]* 
Cagesq 
 
–0.8167 
[–4.8016]* 
0.0003 
[2.2734]* 
–0.0025 
[–1.9430]* 
0.0085 
[2.9817]* 
Cage615 
 
–0.1192 
[–3.8611]* 
0.1248 
[2.9879]* 
0.1156 
[4.2147]* 
–0.0932 
[–2.8197]* 
Cage615sq 
 
–0.0693 
[–4.2143]* 
–0.0366 
[–3.1426]* 
–0.0920 
[–3.9643]* 
0.0629 
[2.8152]* 
Cedu 
 
0.0668 
[4.4987]* 
0.0216 
[3.1991]* 
–0.0423 
[–3.3050]* 
–0.0714 
[–3.7828]* 
Head of Household Characteristics 
Hgen 
 
–0.1745 
[–1.4406]** 
–0.0076 
[–0.0061] 
0.0392 
[1.3136]** 
–0.0132 
[–1.6664]* 
Hage 
 
0.0271 
[1.9828]* 
–0.0059 
[–1.7010]* 
0.0106 
[1.6842]* 
–0.0220 
[–1.6814]* 
Hagesq 
 
–0.0001 
[–1.6454]* 
0.0000 
[0.7250] 
–0.0000 
[–0.2261] 
0.0001 
[0.9098] 
Hedu 
 
1.1230 
[1.8159]* 
–0.1068 
[–1.6632]* 
–0.1058 
[–1.7058]* 
–0.1807 
[–1.6714]* 
Hemp 
 
–0.0480 
[–4.9820]* 
0.0216 
[0.3664] 
–0.1650 
[–1.5153]** 
0.0944 
[0.7943] 
Hy 
 
0.0000 
[1.4264]** 
–8.2585 
[–0.4492] 
–0.0000 
[–1.5979]** 
0.0000 
[0.9174] 
Continued— 
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Table 3—(Continued) 
Parent Characteristics 
Fedu 
 
0.0914 
[1.7902]* 
0.0996 
[0.4135] 
1.0538 
[0.7280] 
0.9603 
[0.6574] 
Femp 
 
0.0001 
[0.3211] 
0.0000 
[0.0102] 
0.0000 
[0] 
0.0069 
[0.9641] 
Fy 
 
0.0099 
[0.5621] 
0.0000 
[0] 
0.0042 
[0.1936] 
0.0000 
[0] 
Medu 
 
0.1184 
[1.9127]* 
–0.0031 
[–1.4739]** 
–0.0382 
[–1.8414]* 
–0.0202 
[–1.7024]* 
Memp 
 
0.1583 
[1.7590]* 
–0.0375 
[–1.0144] 
–0.0145 
[–0.1276] 
0.0561 
[0.4911] 
My –0.0000 
[–0.7255] 
–0.0000 
[–1.1485] 
0.0001 
[2.0916] 
8.1654 
[0.1270] 
Household Characteristics 
Asst 
 
0.0690 
[1.3749]** 
0.0239 
[1.5586]** 
–0.0411 
[–1.8093]* 
0.0447 
[1.8851]* 
Pcexp 
 
0.0001 
[1.3632]** 
0.0000 
[0.4779] 
0.0001 
[0.8129] 
–0.0012 
[–1.7545]* 
Fmsiz 
 
–0.0531 
[–1.7965]* 
–0.0214 
[–1.6329]** 
0.0172 
[1.2850]** 
0.0725 
[1.2903]** 
Child015 
 
–0.0087 
[–0.1913] 
–0.0311 
[–1.9160]* 
–0.0224 
[–1.1813] 
0.0756 
[1.9880]* 
Child04 
 
0.0850 
[1.0247] 
0.0447 
[0.9263] 
–0.0224 
[–0.2679] 
–0.1257 
[–1.6500]* 
Boy16 
 
0.0242 
[1.2979]** 
0.0278 
[0.8566] 
–0.0118 
[–0.0286] 
–0.1029 
[–1.3463]** 
Girl16 
 
0.0887 
[1.3979]** 
0.0099 
[0.4360] 
–0.0020 
[–0.0286] 
–0.1201 
[–1.9232]* 
Loc 
 
0.1573 
[1.3225]** 
–0.0136 
[–0.9334] 
0.0936 
[0.0281] 
–0.0197 
[–0.0357] 
Log of 
Likelihood 
Function 
 
–1822.52 
 
–674.36 
 
–1281.12 
 
–1986 
No. of 
Observations 3868 1069 3054 3993 
R-Squared 0.6954 0.5907 0.6352 0.5989 
Percent Correct 
Predictions 0.8962 0.8321 0.9336 0.8789 
  * Indicates significant at 5 percent level.  
** Indicates significant at 10 percent level. 
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lower probability to go to school. This may be due to the resource constraint effect, 
but another possible explanation may be the delayed first enrolment of children in 
school. As the age of children in the survey is 5–15 years, and there exist few 
facilities for pre-schooling in Pakistan, so usually the children enrolment is delayed. 
A number of studies [see, for instance, Sawada and Lokshin (2000)] confirm the 
phenomenon of delayed school enrolment in Pakistan. The provision of pre-
schooling facilities is recommended in policy formulation, which ultimately may 
enhance the child schooling in the country.   
In the second-stage results, it is found that the younger children are more 
likely to combine schooling with work. The result counters what one would expect, 
that elder children are more likely to combine school and work. 
The birth-order of the child is negatively related to work-only, i.e., the 
younger the child among the brothers and sisters, the less likely it is to do work only. 
Child participation in wage or household enterprises increases with child’s age [see 
also Durrant (1998); Ray (2001)]. Such relation shows the drop-out of children from 
school in higher grades. There may be a number of reasons for the phenomenon, 
namely, as the age of the child increases, the opportunity cost of child education 
increases; by increase in age, the school grade increases, and consequently the 
education cost also increases; for higher grades, there are fewer schools as compared 
to lower-grade schools; the girls’ drop-out rate is higher than boys’ in higher grades 
due to social and cultural discrimination, etc.  
The no-school, no-work or home-care activity decision is positively related to 
the birth-order of the child. The higher the birth-order of the child, that is, the 
younger the child among brothers and sisters, the more likely it is to be in the state of 
no-school and no-work. It explains the fact of delayed first school enrolment as the 
younger children remain at home. The result is corroborated by the summary 
statistics, i.e., the mean of the birth-order of home-care children is the highest in all 
the four categories of child activities (schooling, combining school and work, work 
only, no-school and no-work), so the younger children among their brothers and 
sisters are more likely to remain in no-school, no-work activity. Similarly, no-school 
no-work or the home-care is negatively related to the age of the child. The older the 
child, the less likely it is to do home-care or remain in no-school, no-work situation. 
Gender of the Child. In the context of Pakistan, the gender of the child is one 
of the most important characteristics affecting child schooling [Sathar (1993)]. The 
present study finds that the male children are more likely to go to school as 
compared to female children. This provides confirmation of results by Durrant 
(1998); Sawada and Lokshin (2000); Burki and Shahnaz (2001), and Ray (2001). 
There are several possible explanations for the distinct gender gap. The lack of 
female schools, particularly in rural areas, explains the result. Sawada and Lokshin 
(2000) have described that the high opportunity cost of daughters’ education in 
Pakistan may lead to apparent intra-household discrimination against girls in terms 
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of education. Because of the custom of seclusion of women, parents might have a 
strong negative perception of female education. The low probability for girls’ 
schooling may also reflect the low female teacher availability and poor teaching 
standards in schools [Sathar (1993)]. The traditional and socio-cultural forces create 
the need for women teachers to teach girls. So it requires single sex schools. The 
non-availability of separate schools keeps the girls’ schooling low. Moreover, lack of 
school availability affects female education more seriously than male education 
[Shah (1986)]. The low attendance among girls is also an outcome of strict 
restrictions on their movement outside the home, specifically in rural areas, after 
they reach puberty. The parents perceive girls’ education as less advantageous, and 
there is a high drop-out rate of girls in school. There may be a case of selective 
allocation of resources where girls might enter school but are not able to remain 
there for a long duration, presumably because their brothers get preferential 
treatment [see Emerson and Portela (2001) for Brazil]. Gender has a strong influence 
in rural areas of Pakistan. Being a girl in rural Pakistan reduces the chances of 
attending school [Sathar (1993)].  
The gender of the child also matters in combining school and work, and boys 
are more likely to combine school with work. It is corroborated by the summary 
statistics in Table 2. The mean of the gender of the child in the activity of combining 
school with work is 76, i.e., boys are found to be more prone to combine school with 
work as compared to girls. Moreover, boys are more likely to be in work-only 
category than girls. In the fourth stage, it is found that girls are 9.6 percent more 
likely to do home-care as compared to boys. The possible arrangement consistent 
with these findings is that parents anticipate relatively higher returns from boys’ 
work and at the same time assign household work activities to daughters due to 
social norms. 
Age of the Child. The age of child is an important parameter for the decision 
of child schooling and child labour. The probability derivative of age is found to be 
positive, that is, child schooling increases with age. The result matches with that of 
Burki and Fasih (1998), but it is opposed to the general perception that school 
participation decreases by an increase in age [see Illahi (2001)]. It signifies that child 
enrolment is delayed. I have taken the minimum age of child to be in school as 5 
years. At this age the children are not sent to school; that is the explanation of 
positive probability. In Pakistani rural areas [see, Ali and Khan (2003)] and in urban 
areas [see, Ali and Khan (2004)] the school enrolment is delayed. So regardless of 
the rural or urban areas, the school enrolment of children is delayed at the national 
level. The negative sign of age squared shows that the probability of going to school 
increases at a decreasing rate. It suggests an inverted U-shaped (∩) relationship 
between age and child schooling. The decrease in schooling at later age of children 
reflects the increase in forgone earnings with age. As the child grows older, the 
potential of earnings increases. Therefore, he/she is pulled out of school.  
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The focus of the study is activities of the children in the age group of 5–15 
years. It is found that first enrolment of children is delayed and the parents do not 
send their children to school at the age of five. I have also taken the children in the 
age group of 6–15 years to see what happens to the child’s schooling by increase in 
the age of child after enrolment. In this age group, the age of the child has shown a 
negative impact on the child’s schooling. Probability for the child to go to school 
decreases at the decreasing rate.   
The child’s age matters in the decision to allow him/her to combine schooling 
and work, and the probability of the child to combine schooling and work decreases 
with age. The positive age squared suggests, however, that the effect becomes 
stronger in the higher age group. Maitra and Ray (2000) found that, for Pakistan, age 
increases the likelihood that the child either goes to school-only or work-only. Age 
of the child has a positive impact on work decision: the older the child, the more 
probable he/she is to go to work.  
It is found in the fourth-stage results that home-care activity is negatively 
related to the age of the child (for the age cohort of 5–15 years). The older the child 
is, the less likely it is for him/her to do home-care. Each additional year of age of 
child decreases the likelihood of his or her doing home-care by 15.7 percent. It is 
estimated in the third-stage results that the increase in age enhances the probability 
for work only. Similarly, the increase in the age of the child enhances school 
participation (first-stage results). The notion supports the fact that as the age of the 
child increases, either she/he will go to school or to work, instead of doing home-
care. For the children in the age group of 6-15 years, each additional year of child’s 
age decreases the likelihood for home-care by 9.3 percent at an increasing rate. It 
decreases the school participation as well (first-stage results) and increases the labour 
force participation (third-stage results). It means that as the age of the child 
increases, most probably she/he will go to work.  
Educational Level of Child. The current years of education of child increase 
the probability to combine school and work. It shows that a child has to work to meet 
his educational expenditures. As the education level increases, the educational cost 
increases, so the probability to combine schooling and work increases. The result 
supports the findings of Ali and Khan (2003) for rural areas of Pakistan. 
Each additional year of education of the child decreases the probability to 
work by 4.2 percent. So it may be concluded that work is the flip side of schooling. 
Similarly, each additional year of education of the child decreases the likelihood to 
opt either school or work by 7.1 percent.  
As a policy matter an increase in the provision of schooling opportunities may 
decrease the child labour as well as no-school, no-work activity of the children. The 
increase in school enrolment by policy implementation will put the children of the 
category of no-school, no-work/home-care into the school category more intensively, 
rather than among working children. It is further supported by the summary statistics 
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in Table 2, as mean years of schooling of working children are the second lowest and 
those of home-care children are the lowest in all categories of children. As more girls 
are engaged in home-care activity, they will be the bigger beneficiaries of such a 
shift in school enrolment policy. 
Gender of the Head of Household. The parameters of head of the household 
are critical in determining the child labour decision. I capture gender and 
vulnerability indicators by using a dummy for female headship. Though the concept 
of female headship has come under a lot of criticism for not adequately identifying 
gender vulnerability, it remains the most useful single indicator in the absence of 
anything better [see Rosenhouse (1989); Mason and Lampietti (1998)].  Ray (2000) 
notes that female-headed households are more vulnerable to poverty and are much 
more dependent on children’s earnings than male-headed households. So the 
probability of working children coming from female-headed homes is high. 
Psacharopoulos (1997) finds that the probability of a working child is higher in 
female-headed households in Bolivia. On the other hand, Canagarajah and Coulombe 
(1998) find that children from female-headed households are more likely to go to 
school in Ghana. Maitra and Ray (2000) find for Pakistan that gender of the head of 
the households does not matter in the schooling decision of children. Ali and Khan 
(2003) find that in the rural areas of Pakistan, children from male-headed household 
are less likely to go to school. This makes the impact of the gender of the head of the 
household on schooling decision in Pakistan as well as other countries ambiguous in 
economic literature. My objective in including the gender of the headship as an 
indicator of gender vulnerability and female decision-making is to see if children’s 
time allocation in such households is significantly different from their counterparts’ 
in male-headed households. I find that children from male-headed households have 
17 percent lower propensity for school [see also Burki and Shahnaz (2001)].  
The study supports an interesting relationship between gender of the head of 
household and work decision of children. The children from male-headed households 
are 4 percent more likely to go for work. It means that despite the lower socio-
economic status of female heads (normally mothers), females are good household 
managers regarding children’s education. The phenomenon may be viewed form 
another angle: Why does the female head of household not take other options for her 
children? Are female heads of households unable to take other options and are under 
compulsion to send their children to school? The usual inverse of schooling is work, 
apprenticeship or work at household enterprises, but these options require either 
physical capital or social capital which poor female heads rarely have. So the only 
option remaining is to send the children to school.  
The children from female-headed households are 1.3 percent more likely to 
take home-care. Here an economic factor is involved. The female heads have to 
participate in out-of-home economic activities to support the family. So children 
(specifically girls) have to remain at home for domestic chores. Moreover, the 
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female heads have lower social capital, so they have lower probability to engage 
their children in apprenticeship, training, or learning by doing activity. On the other 
hand, the male heads of households have comparatively more economic 
opportunities and social capital. So the children from the male-headed households 
have 4 percent more access to work. 
Age of the Head of Household. The stage in the lifecycle of the head of the 
household has shown a positive effect on children’s schooling. The probability of a 
child’s going to school increases by an increase in the age of the head of the 
household at a decreasing rate. The older the head of the household, the more likely 
it is that the child attends school only. The possible explanation is economic in 
nature. By increase in age, the skill and experience of the head of the household 
expands. So his or her increased earning capacity makes the household economically 
more viable, and the head of the household therefore decides to send the children to 
school. On the same lines, the older head of the household has comparatively older 
children (more than 15 years of age) as compared to a younger head of the 
household. These older siblings have an earning capacity (older siblings are more 
likely to work—third-stage result of birth-order parameter of child). So the financial 
status of the household is enhanced, and as a result school-age children are more 
likely to go to school. Furthermore, if the head of the household is older, who is 
often father or mother of the children, and the older siblings (more than 15 years of 
age) are studying instead of earning, the children in the school-going age are more 
likely to go to school on account of economies of scale of education within the 
household. Another explanation may be the increased awareness about the 
advantages of education with every additional year in age.  
Lifecycle of the head of the household has shown a negative effect at second-
stage and a positive effect at third-stage of results. The more the age of the head of 
household, the less likely for the child to combine school with work and the more 
likely for the child to work. The children from households with older heads of 
households are less likely to engage in home-care/neither-school nor-work activity, 
but they are more likely to go to school-only or work-only. The intra-comparison 
between the probabilities to go to school and to work makes clear that the child will 
more probably go to school. 
Education of the Head of Household. It is generally perceived that the 
education of the head of the household plays a positive role in the child’s probability 
to go to school. For instance, Ali and Khan (2003) find that in the rural areas of 
Pakistan, the probability of a child’s going to school increases by 9.7 percent by an 
increase of one year of schooling of the head of household on average. This indicates 
an important complementarity between the education of the head of the household 
and the child’s schooling. This complementarity is generated possibly by an 
educated parent’s improved technical or allocative efficiency, his superior home 
teaching environment, and his feeling an incentive in educating children [Behrman, 
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et al. (2000)]. I find that there exists a positive relation between the educational level 
of the head of the household and the child’s schooling. One additional year of 
education of the head of the household increases the chances of the child’s schooling 
by 12 percent [see also Burki and Shahnaz (2001) for such type of results]. It is 
further supported by results of summary statistics, i.e., the mean of the years of 
education of the head of household of school-going children is the highest in all 
categories of the heads of households (heads of households of school-going children, 
heads of households of children combining school and work, heads of households of 
child labourers, and heads of households of home-care children). On the other hand, 
the heads of households of child labour-producing households have the lowest level 
of education (see Table 2).  
Education of the head of the household has shown significant and negative 
impact on child’s work. On average, one additional year of education of the head of 
the household decreases the probability of the child’s going to work by 10.5 percent. 
The explanation is that the educated head of household distinctly perceives the 
disadvantages of work and benefits of education.  
The education of the head of the household decreases the likelihood that the 
child will be engaged in work-only and home-care. Each additional year of education 
of the head of the household decreases the likelihood of the child’s going to work-
only and home-care by 10 and 18 percent respectively.  
Employment Status and Income of the Head of the Household. Some studies 
[see, for instance, Ali and Khan (2003) for the rural areas of Pakistan] find that the 
employment status of the head of the household affects schooling positively. It 
highlights the fact that an unemployed head of the household cannot insure himself 
against income fluctuations, which creates supply of child labour from the 
household. Burki and Shahnaz (2001) find that the employment status of the head of 
the household does not influence the schooling or work choices of children. But the 
present study shows the surprising results, i.e., the children of the employed heads of 
households are 4.8 percent less likely to go to school. On the other hand, they are 
16.5 percent less likely to work. Moreover, the income level of the head of the 
household does not matter in the schooling decision.   
Similarly, both employment level and income level of the head of the 
household have a negative impact on child’s work. As the head of the household is 
the major contributor to household income, his employment makes the household 
income stable and reduces the need for child labour. At the same time, the increase in 
income of the head of the household decreases the probability for the child to work 
[see also Ali and Khan (2003)]. In other words, the decline in poverty reduces child 
labour. The results from summary statistics confirm the finding that the income level 
of the head of the household has a negative impact on child’s work, as the income of 
the head of the household in the child labour-producing households is the lowest as 
compared to that of other groups of households (households producing school-going 
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children, households producing part-time labourers, households producing full-time 
labourers, households producing home-care children). 
Parental Education, Employment, and Income. It is unequivocally brought 
out in the economic literature that there is a strong link between parental education 
and likelihood of child schooling [see, Emerson and Portela (2001)]. Parents who 
have themselves been to school are presumably more likely to invest in the education 
of their children. It is evident from the summary statistics of the present study that 
the school-going children have parents with more years of education on average as 
compared to the children involved in other activities. I find that father’s education 
has a positive effect on child’s schooling. One additional year of education of father 
increases the probability of child’s schooling by 9.1 percent. It provides strong 
evidence of inter-generational persistence of illiteracy, as well as child labour among 
such illiterate families. The fathers who are less educated invest less in their 
children’s education, thereby keeping them illiterate. The finding is consistent with 
the results of a number of studies [see, for instance, Bell and Gersbach (2000); Dessy 
(2000); Emerson and Portela (2000)]. But father’s employment and income does not 
matter regarding child’s schooling. 
Mother’s education has a positive effect on child’s schooling, as one 
additional year of the education of mother increases the child’s school participation 
by 11.8 percent. It is concluded that in Pakistan the impact of mother’s education on 
child’s schooling seems stronger than that of father’s education [see also Sathar 
(1993); Burki and Shahnaz (2001)].  
The more educated women perceive their children’s education positively and 
decide to send their children to school-only, but not to work, and not to remain in the 
state of no-school and no-work. The mother’s employment results in 16 percent more 
probability for the child to go to school. It may also be concluded that educated 
working women perceive education positively on the basis of financial returns to 
education, as they themselves have gained these returns. 
Mother’s education is negatively related to the decision to combine school and 
work and work-only. One additional year of education of mother decreases the 
child’s probability to work by an almost 4 percent. Similarly, it is negatively related 
to no-school, no-work decision. So it is concluded that mother’s education supports 
child’s schooling and depresses the child’s work and home-care. It supports the 
general perception that parental education is associated with a lower incidence of 
child labour and a higher school attendance rate. The education of parents influences 
child schooling through their favourable attitude towards child schooling.  
The father’s employment, and father’s and mother’s income do not matter in 
child’s schooling. Among the parent’s parameters, education is a significant factor 
for child’s schooling and child labour. Adult education, therefore, stands prominently 
among the policy proposals. 
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The child labour literature [see, Basu and Van (1998); Dessy (2000); Emerson 
and Portela (2000); Baland and Robinson (2000); Bell and Gersbach (2000)] 
generally assumes that parents have common preferences for their children. But the 
present study suggests that fathers and mothers have different impacts on the 
children’s activities. This is potentially related to their relative bargaining power [see 
also Basu (2001); Ridao-Cano (2000)]. Moreover, it supports the rejection of the 
unitary family model that assumes that parents have common preferences for their 
children and pool their resources.  
Assets. Conceptually, it is believed that children from asset-rich households 
are more likely to go to school or less likely to work than from asset-poor 
households. Bhalotra and Heady (2001) find that large holdings by the household 
increase the probability of child work and decrease child’s probability to attend 
school. They term it as “wealth paradox”. The wealth paradox seems more evident 
for Pakistani rural girls than for boys, i.e., daughters of land-rich households are 
more likely to work than are the daughters of land-poor households. The paradoxical 
pattern is weak for boys. The available theoretical and empirical literature on child 
labour does not satisfactorily explain the wealth paradox. The theoretical literature 
on child labour has emphasised credit market imperfection as a possible explanation 
of the wealth paradox [see, for example, Ranjan (1999); Jafarey and Lahiri (2002)]. 
Bhalotra and Heady (2001) also emphasise that labour market failure may account 
for the wealth paradox. I find that if the household has assets, the child has 6.9 
percent more probability to go to school-only. The ownership of assets, like a 
household enterprise, house, land, agricultural machinery and instruments, shop, etc., 
is an obvious measure of a household’s wealth. Hence the results suggest that the 
probability of child’s schooling is systematically higher for households with wealth. 
Moreover, ownership of assets makes the household stable against the fluctuations in 
income through credit procurement or sale of the assets. The household with 
holdings may easily afford to hire wage labour instead of drawing children out of 
school and involving them in work [see Sathar (1993)]. Another model of child 
labour include household assets, i.e., human capital, physical assets (land, dwelling, 
farm implements, durable goods) and financial savings and finds that the ownership 
of assets leads to a significantly higher probability of school attendance [Jenson and 
Neilsen (1997)].   
In the second-stage results, the presence of assets in the household has shown 
a positive impact on child’s activity of combining school and work. If the household 
has assets, it is 2.3 percent more likely for the child to combine school and work, but 
the probability of going to school-only is still higher.  
The ownership of assets has shown a negative impact on the decision of the 
parents to send their children to work-only. The possible explanation may be that the 
presence of assets in a household increases the financial status of the household, and 
decreases the fluctuation in the income of the household. So a household owning 
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assets does not rely on child labour. Furthermore, in such households, the education 
cost is easily affordable. The result is contradicted by Ali and Khan (2003) for the 
rural areas of Pakistan; they find a positive impact of ownership of assets on child 
labour, showing a complementarity between assets and child labour. They explain 
the phenomenon that the presence of family enterprises makes it easier for families 
to put their children to work. Another study argues that a family may only be able to 
use assets if their children work [Brown (2001), p. 9].  
The ownership of assets by the household decreases the probability for the 
children to do home-care. The children from the households with ownership of assets 
are 4.4 percent more likely to do home-care. The children from households with 
assets either go to school (evident from the first-stage result) or combine school with 
work (from the second-stage results). When the assets increase, the income of the 
household increases and the household decides to send its children to school. They 
combine school with work because they have the opportunity for it on account of 
ownership of physical capital assets. They do not go for work (from the third-stage 
results) because the households have enough income from the assets, so the children 
are not required to work. It seems that the children from the households with 
ownership of assets should not be involved in home-care. The adoption of home-care 
activity reveals many loopholes in the schooling system. Although the parents of 
households with assets have the capacity to finance schooling, yet they keep them in 
home-care. The reasons may be problems with the schooling system, such as the low 
quality of education, irrelevant education, no financial returns to education, or 
bored/boring or dull education, harsh attitude of teachers, teacher’s absenteeism, etc. 
It means the deficiencies in the educational system cause the low school enrolment 
from these households.  
Per Capita Income of the Household. Per capita income of the household is 
an important explanatory variable from the point of view of policy option to 
eliminate child labour. Per capita income of the household represents the poverty 
level of the household. If it is assumed that there exists a positive relation between 
per capita income and schooling of children, and a negative relation between per 
capita income and child labour, i.e., poverty compels the parents to get their children 
drop out of school and send them to work, then in such situations the interventions 
like trade sanctions or bans on child labour and legal interventions in schooling and 
child labour will tend to further impoverish the already poor households. Secondly, 
any intervention in the education sector is likely to be limited in its scope and effect 
unless the opportunity cost of sending children to school is lowered. The most 
puzzling feature in this area, emerging from a review of empirical research, is that 
income effect on child labour differs across studies. An insignificant effect is 
reported by Coulombe [(1998) for Cote d’ Ivoire], Illahi [(2001) for rural boys in 
Peru] and Ray [(2000a) for Pakistan]. A positive coefficient on income is obtained 
by Cartwright [(1999) household farm/enterprise work for Colombia] and Patrinos 
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and Psacharopoulos [(1994) for Paraguay]. Negative income effects are found in 
Cartwright [(1999) wage work for rural Colombia], Cigno and Rosati [(2000) for 
rural India] and Ray [(2000) for Peru]. In my study, per capita income seems to 
influence the activities of children by increasing the likelihood of schooling. It is 
corroborated by the results of summary statistics: school-going children belong to 
households having a comparatively higher per capita household income, while the 
working children belong to households with a lower per capita income. The per 
capita income of the household is negatively related to no-school, no-work decision, 
that is, the children from poor households are less likely to live in no-school, no-
work status. Due to poverty, the poor parents cannot send their children to school but 
engage them in work, as they can not afford to keep their children in no-school, no-
work situation for any considerable length of time.  
Household Size and Composition. The considerations leading to children’s 
attending school are influenced by the number of persons required by each 
household to perform various household chores to supplement household income. In 
this regard, the household size and composition may be quite crucial for determining 
the required household labour. In the context of Pakistan, I find that the household 
size and composition exerts an impact on child’s schooling. From the quantitative 
results, it is evident that the families of school-going children have the lowest 
number of family members on average in all categories of households (households 
producing school-going children, households producing part-time child labourers, 
households producing child labour, and households producing home-care children). 
Similarly, school-going children belong to families in which the number of children 
(up to 15 years) is comparatively lower than in families producing child labour or 
home-care children. From the econometric results, the larger household size reduces 
the propensity to go to school. One additional member of the household reduces the 
likelihood of schooling of children by 5.3 percent. Even it reduces the likelihood of 
combining school and work by 2.1 percent. On the other hand, an incremental 
change in family size increases the work probability by 1.7 percent, and home-care 
probability by 7.2 percent.  
As concerns the number of children (up to the age of 15 years) in the 
household, it has a negative effect on schooling. The explanation, as given by Ray 
[(2001), p. 10], is that a child living in a household containing a large number of 
children is more likely to be living in poverty than a child residing in a household 
with a few children. Sawada and Lokshin [(2000), p. 15] had similar results; that 
students who could obtain higher education are from households with a smaller 
number of children. This is a reflection of the intra-household resource competition. 
Sathar (1993) also states that children from households with a large number of 
siblings are more likely to drop out.  
The larger number of children (up to the age of 15 years) in the household 
decreases the probability for the school-age child to combine school and work as 
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well as to go for work-only. On the other hand, larger number of such children 
increases their probability to do home-care. But the number of infants, i.e., siblings 
less than five years of age, increases the probability for the children to combine 
school and work. It reveals the resource competition effect.  
The presence of prime-age (more than 15 years) male and female siblings 
(separately) in the household influences the propensity for the child to go to school 
positively. The explanation is that these siblings lower the need for household 
working time and free the school-age children to go to school. The presence of 
female siblings has more impact as compared to male siblings on the decision to 
send children to school. The number of these siblings decreases the probability to do 
home-care, and here again the impact of female children is higher. It supports the 
view that prime-age siblings replace the school-age children in home-care activity. 
Locality of the Household. The rural or urban location of the household has a 
fairly strong effect on the schooling of children. I find that children from the urban 
areas are 15.73 percent more likely to go to school than those from the rural areas 
[see also Burki and Shahnaz (2001)]. The finding corroborates the figures of school 
enrolment at the national level, for both the urban and the rural areas. 
 
SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS 
 • The first school enrolment of children is delayed in Pakistan. But after 
enrolment, school participation decreases by the increase in the age of the 
child. 
 • In the schooling of children, there exists a very pronounced gender gap in 
favour of boys. 
 • Boys are more likely to go to school and work simultaneously than girls, and 
they do it to support their education. Similarly, boys are more likely to 
engage in work than are girls. 
 • The current number of years of education of children decreases the 
probability for work but increases the probability to combine school with 
work. 
 • The head of the household (father and mother of the household) of school-
going children has a much higher level of education as compared to the other 
three categories of children (combining school and work, work-only, and no-
school, no-work). 
 • Average numbers of years of education of the head of the household (father 
and mother in the household) producing child labour is the lowest in relation 
to that of their counterparts. 
 • The head of the household (father and mother of the household) whose 
children go to school has a higher level of income as compared to the income 
of those whose children are involved in other categories. 
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 • The head of the household (father and mother) in the child labour-producing 
households has the lowest level of income in relation to households whose 
children are involved in other activities. 
 • The school-going children belong to households with the highest per capita 
household income, while child labour comes from households with the 
lowest per capita income. 
 • The children from female-headed households are more likely to go to school. 
Therefore, it follows that women are good managers of households and have 
a good approach towards education. 
 • Education of the adults in the households, particularly mothers, has a positive 
impact on child’s schooling. So adult literacy is an important policy option 
for the elimination of child labour. 
 • Poverty in all its aspects (income of the household, per capita household 
income, and ownership of assets) is the major cause of low school 
participation and high level of child labour force participation. Poverty 
alleviation is a good policy option for increasing school participation and 
decreasing child labour. 
 • The school-going children belong to the smallest families and home-care 
children belong to the largest families in all categories of children. 
 • As concerns the composition of the household, the school-going children 
come from families in which the number of children (up to the age of 15) is 
the lowest in all categories of children, while home-care children come from 
families having the highest number of such children. 
 • Large family size reduces the probability for the children to go to school. 
Population planning is a good tool for increasing enrolments. 
 • Rural or urban locality of the household also has an impact on the schooling 
decision of the children. The children from an urban locality are more likely 
to go to school as compared to those from a rural locality. The elimination of 
rural-urban disparity and the provision of educational facilities and incentives 
for schooling in the rural areas are recommended. 
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